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We offer a practical test of local government effectiveness in the provision of public services.  
Building on the work of Brueckner (1979, 1982, 1983) and Henderson (1990, 1995) we offer a 
property value maximization model where levels of local public services are capitalized into 
property values.  Using data for Wisconsin municipalities we demonstrate that service 
expenditure levels, and corresponding taxation levels, should be increased.  In other words, the 
property value maximization test suggests that local public services in Wisconsin are 
consistently under-provided.  By monitoring local property values officials can objectively 




Local governments of all types are faced with increasing pressure to “do more with 
less,” be “leaner and meaner” and to maintain high quality of local public services while at the 
same time reducing the tax burden on local residents (Welch 1985; Hondle, Costa and Cigler 
2004).  Although the pressure to “do more with less” is not a new phenomenon, there is a 
sense across the U.S. that the pressure has reached critical levels (Osbourne and Hutchinson 
2004).   
The growing pressure to do more with less and to increase public service levels in the 
face of strong opposition to raising taxes of any form, local public officials are faced with trying 
something different.  In response, officials are increasingly turning to the notions of 
“benchmarking,” “performance measurement” and “productivity standards” to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of their operations (Ammons 1996; Berman 1998; Hatry 1999; 
Rosen 1993).  The explicit guidelines established by Government Performance Results Act of 
1996 and the increasingly widespread use of productivity improvement efforts in larger cities 
strongly suggest that the pressure to adopt more aggressive management practices at all levels 
of government is real and unlikely to soften anytime in the near future. 
The intent of this applied research study is to offer an alternative way of thinking about 
effectiveness in the provision of public services at the local level.  By building on the idea of 
property value capitalization within the regional economics literature we outline a model of 
allocative efficiency.  By statistically modeling how public service levels are captured, or 
capitalized, into property values normative statements about the effectiveness of local 
governments can be advanced.  Beyond these brief introductory comments, the study is 
composed of four sections.  In the next section we review the theoretical foundations for our 
  1property value capitalization model by building on the property value maximization model of 
Brueckner (1979, 1982, 1983) and Henderson (1990, 1995).  In the third section we outline our 
empirical application of the capitalization model using data for Wisconsin municipalities.  We 
then present our empirical results and offer a way to use the results of the statistical modeling 
approach to draw inferences about the allocative efficiency, or effectiveness, of individual 
municipalities in our sample.  The closing section of the study outlines the study 
accomplishments.   
 
 
                                                          
An Economic Model of Public Sector Effectiveness and Allocative Efficiency 
 
Performance measurement relative to allocative efficiency (or effectiveness) can fall 
into several unintended traps such as the performance paradox, tunnel vision and analysis 
paralysis (van Thiel and Leeuw 2002).  This can range from subjective measures to managers 
loosing sight of the bigger picture.  As noted by Dowding and Mergoupis (2003) allocative 
efficiency is usually measured by examining satisfaction as revealed through citizen surveys. 
Such interpretation of stated preferences, however, often lacks theoretical justification. We 
suggest that by turning to models of competitive markets as advanced by Tiebout (1956) and 
refined by Peterson (1981) a more objective and constructive measure of local government 
effectiveness can be offered.
1   
Building on the widely held notion of public service capitalization into local property 
values first offered by Oates (1969) a market based objective measure of effectiveness is 
offered.  We suggest that the property value maximization models of Brueckner (1979, 1982, 
1983) and Henderson (1980, 1985) offer such a test.  In brief, Brueckner and Henderson show 
that local public services are offered in a manner such that local property values are 
maximized, then the economic definition of allocative efficiency (effectiveness) offered by 
Samuelson (1954) is satisfied. 
If individual and businesses base their location decisions not only on the overall 
characteristics of a given community but also on the menu of public goods and services 
available along with the tax liabilities imposed by local governments, the overall value of 
property in a given community can provide useful information about the performance of its local 
government. That will happen because within a group of communities with similar geographical 
and socioeconomic characteristics, individuals and firms would be willing to pay more to live 
and operate, respectively, in the community, which provides the higher quality or volume of 
 
1 This can also be thought of through the public choice model of fragmented and overlapping 
local jurisdictions that are competing for economic growth and development (Bish and Ostrom 
1979; March and Olsen 1989; Ostrom 1989; McCabe and Vinzant 1999). 
 
  2public services at lower tax rates. In the short-run given a fixed land and housing stock, this 
higher demand will be translated into higher property values for existent real estate in that 
community. 
To the extent that resources for the public provision good and services in a community 
were at least partially raised through the imposition of property taxes, an increase in the level of 
those public goods would not have a trivial effect on property values. While an increase in local 
public services will increase the menu of amenities available to property renters or owners, 
bidding up property values; on the other it would require local governments to raise local taxes 
with exactly opposite effects on property values.  
This theoretical result formalized the non-linear effects of local public expenditures on 
aggregate property value as an inverted U-shaped function with the maximum occurring at the 
level where the provision of such public goods and services is efficient in an allocative sense.  
Brueckner, and latter Henderson, further explored this result in a test based on the effect of 
changes in the level of government expenditures on property values.
  
The “Brueckner relationship” for the particular case where only one type of public good 
is provided is illustrated in Figure 1.  If local governments are currently under-supplying the 
local public good (spending too little), increases in expenditures, even if followed by an identical 
increase in taxes, should increase property values (point A). At some point, further increases in 
government expenditures would require unattractive tax rates thus causing property values to 
decline. This would indicate an over-supply of local public goods (too much is spent) – point C. 
At the efficient level, any small increase or decrease away from it will have no effect on property 
values for that community (point B). 
The notion of Tiebout-Peterson-like competition between communities resulting in 
measurable differences in local property values has produced a large and robust empirical 
literature (Hoyt 1990; Kohlhepp and Ingene 1979; Sonstelie and Portney 1980; Wildasin 1979; 
Yinger 1982).  But in an extensive review of the empirical literature Dowding, John and Bigss 
(1994) find that support for Tiebout-Peterson depends on the approach of the study.  More 
“macro” approaches tend to support Tiebout-Peterson whereas more “micro” approaches tend 
to challenge Tiebout-Peterson.  As noted by Krane, Ebdon and Bartle (2004) more recent 
studies (Basolo and Huang 2001; Musso 2001; Rhode and Strumpf 2000; Rusk 1995; Smith 
and Smyth 1996) have found various flaws in the Tiebout-Peterson model and its application to 
local government behavior. In the simplest sense citizens are hard-pressed to judge the validity 
of service quality claims and typically possess little knowledge about services in other 
communities (Krane, Ebdon and Bartle 2004; Lowery, Lyons and De Hoog 1990; Ostrom, Bish 
and Ostrom 1988) 
McCabe and Vinzant (1999) correctly argue that in Tiebout-Peterson-like competition 
models migration, or exit and entry, becomes the only signal of preference and consumers call 
  3the shots. Although out-migration is a clear signal of dissatisfaction and in-migration is a clear 
signal of satisfaction, migration is not the only way of expressing levels of satisfaction.   
Particularly in community level politics citizen involvement through voting plays a central role in 
political behavior (Lyons and Lowery 1989; Lyons, Lowery and DeHoog 1992).    
While one could argue that this central focus on migration is a weakness to the 
capitalization type model we offer here, theoretical work by Brueckner and Joo (1991) and 
Sasaki (2000) suggest that when voting is introduced the logic of capitalization follows.  In 
short, for most households their primary source of wealth rests in their residents and will vote 
strategically to maximize their net wealth.  Whether or not people “vote with their feet” or 
“through the ballot box” local officials still have a strong incentive to allocate public services in a 
manner consistent with aggregate property valuation maximization.  Only in the case were the 
voter’s preferences do not line up with the migrant’s preferences are sufficient levels of noise 
introduced to cause potential distortions in empirical capitalization studies.  The theory 
suggests that this problem is likely to occur in the short-run, in the long-run preferences will 
tend to converge through a traditional Tiebout-Peterson-type sorting process.   
One of the frustrations with a Tiebout-Peterson world of migration is that local public 
officials are delegated to a passive roll; they establish a service level package with a 
corresponding tax mix and then step back and let people self-select.  Our model provides a 
clear decision rule for local officials, one of property value maximization.  Here local officials 
can monitor the reaction of the local real estate market to changes in fiscal policy.  Indeed, we 
suggest that the property value maximization approach provides local decision makers with a 
comprehensive and practical test of allocative efficiency (effectiveness). 
To implement the Brueckner test we follow the applications of the property value 
maximization model as suggested by Deller (1990a, 1990b), Taylor (1995) and Bates and 
Santerre (2003) one needs to collect a sample of municipal observations on aggregate property 
values and public service provision levels.  In practice public expenditures serve as a proxy for 
quantity and quality.  Since property values are also affected by other factors such as the 
wealth and socioeconomic characteristics of the community, measures of these variables are 
also required. 
The next step is to use multiple regression analysis to estimate the inverted-U that an 
increase or decrease in a given category of local public expenditure will have on a community’s 
total property value controlling for other factors.  A statistically positive regression coefficient on 
expenditures indicates that all observations lie to the right of the peak of the inverted-U with the 
regression line being of the type that passes through point A in Figure 1.  This result indicates 
that all communities share a common efficiency bias, which in this case is negative, specifically, 
all communities are under-spending or at least are not overspending.  Analogously, a 
statistically negative coefficient indicates that all observations lie to the left of the peak of the 
  4inverted U-curve with the regression line passing through point C in Figure 1. All communities 
will be overspending or at least not under-spending. All individuals may perceive a decrease in 
expenditure as desirable. 
The test is less conclusive when the estimated regression coefficients are not 
statistically significantly different from zero. Either communities do not present a common 
efficiency bias with some communities under-spending and others overspending or all 
communities are spending at the efficient level with the regression line passing through point B 
in Figure 1.
2  Brueckner prefers the latter and less strong interpretation of the results. 
As it was mentioned above, local public expenditures are at least partially financed with 
property taxes raised locally in the community. Because of that, the Brueckner relationship can 
be reinterpreted in terms of the effects of taxes on local public sector efficiency, specifically, 
under-spending can be associated with under-taxation, over-spending with over-taxation.  This 
broad interpretation provides a link between the two tests provided in the applied research 
study.   
 
 
An Empirical Model of Public Sector Effectiveness and Allocative Efficiency 
 
  To estimate the model outlined in the previous section we use data for 1,830 
municipalities in Wisconsin.  Municipalities in Wisconsin are composed of 190 cities, 395 
villages and 1,250 towns. Expenditure and property valuation data are drawn from the 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue’s annual municipal and county revenues and expenditure 
report and the socioeconomic data are from the 2000 Census.  Expenditure and property 
valuation data are an annual average over the period 1998 to 2000.  We use an average to 
minimize the effects of large one-time unique expenditures that tend to introduce “spikes” into 
the data. 
  The basic equation to be estimated takes the form: 
TOTVAL = β0 + β1EXP + β2 (EXP*EXP) + Σi=3…21β iZi + ε    (1) 
where TOTVAL is total equalized assessed property value, EXP is expenditures by the local 
unit of government and Z is a set of 18 socioeconomic control variables and ε is a regression 
error term that assumed to be well behaved.  The curvature of the expenditure-property value 
relationship is captured by expenditures squared (EXP*EXP) term.
3  In the strictest sense, if 
                                                           
2 Another possibility is that local public expenditures are simply not capitalized into property 
values. 
3 One potential criticism of the Brueckner test concerns the functional form of the regression 
equation. While Brueckner’s model finds aggregate property values to be a single peaked 
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expect β1 = β2 = 0, or the data would be clustered at the top of the inverted-U outlined in Figure 
1.
4 This result would provide prima fascia evidence that municipalities in Wisconsin do not 
systematically over- or under-provide services.   
Based on the theory there are two other possible out comes, one of over-provision and 
one of under-provision.  In the case of over-provision we would expect to see β1 < 0 and β2 < 0 
or the data is clustering on the right-hand-side of the inverted-U.  This result is consistent with 
the argument that government is “too big.”  In the case of under-provision we would expect to 
see β1 > 0 and β2 < 0 or the data is clustering on the left-hand-side of the theoretical inverted-U.  
Here one could argue that public service levels are too small and spending, along with 
corresponding taxation levels, could be increased. 
  Property valuation, the dependent variable in our models, warrants special discussion.  
In Wisconsin, property is to be assessed at full market value or fair market value and is defined 
as “the amount the property will sell for in an arms-length transaction on the open market 
between a willing seller not obliged to sell the property and a willing buyer not obliged to 
purchase it.”
5  Because assessors in different taxing districts may value similar properties at 
different levels, it is necessary for the Department of Revenue to convert the assessed values, 
by taxing jurisdiction, to a uniform level. These uniform values, or equalized values, are 
adjusted to be as close to 100 percent of market value as possible. The equalization occurs at 
the municipal rather than the individual property level and for our purposes serves as a quality 
check on property values.  The equalized values are used for apportioning county property 
taxes, public school taxes, vocational school taxes, and for distributing property tax relief. 
The control variables include: 
                                                                                                                                                                         
concave function of local government expenditures, Brueckner’s test specifies and estimates a 
linear function.  
 
4 A second centers on the real possibility of Type II regression error, or incorrectly rejecting a 
false statistical null hypothesis.  The condition β1 = β2 = 0 is generally observed by statistical 
insignificance, often through small t-statistics.  But, there are numerous other reasons beyond 
optimal service provision levels that might cause the statistical result of β1 = β2 = 0.  If the 
Brueckner test has a fatal flaw it centers on Type II error.     
 
5 Waste Management v. Kenosha County Review Board 184 Wis. 2nd 541, (1994).  For a 
general discussion of the Wisconsin property tax assessment process see “Guide for Property 
Owners, Wisconsin Department of Revenue 2004 available on the web at: 
http://www.dor.state.wi.us/pubs/slf/pb060.pdf 
 
  6• Population 
•  Percent of the Population under Age 20 
•  Percent of the Population over Age 65 
•  Percent of Housing Stock Classified as Recreational 
•  Percent of Occupied Houses Occupied by Owners 
•  Percent of Persons over 25 with High School Education or Less 
• Unemployment  Rate 
•  Percent of Employed Persons in Farming, Fishing and Forestry 
•  Percent of Employed Persons in Professional Occupations 
•  Percent of Employed Persons in Manufacturing 
•  Percent of Households with Income less than $15,000 
•  Percent of Households with Income over $100,000 
•  Percent of Household with Social Security Income 
•  Per Capita Income 
•  Percent of Housing Stock Built Since 1980 
• Median  House  Value 
•  Median Rent Value 
•  Municipal Type Identifier 
 
This collection of control variables is designed to capture several different elements of the local 
community and draws on the wealth of available capitalization literature (Bates and Santerre 
2003; Deller 1990a, 1990b; Dowding, John and Bigss 1994; Taylor 1995). Population is 
intended to capture the scale or size of the municipality, age profiles and income measures 
capture demand preferences of local residents, and employment shares control for the 
structure of the local economy.   Descriptive statistics of the set of control variables are 
provided in Table 1. 
In addition to examining total expenditures, we look for effectiveness levels in ten 
separate expenditure categories including: 
 
• Total  Expenditures 
• Government  Administration 
• Police  Protection 
• Fire  Protection 
• Ambulatory  Service 
• Road  Maintenance 
• Waste  Services 
•  Health and Human Services 
•  Cultural and Educational Services 
•  Parks and Recreational Services 
•  Conservation and Community Development Programs 
 
By examining individual expenditure categories allocative efficiency judgments can be made on 
services by type.
  7Empirical Results 
A total of eleven models (Models A through K) are estimated and reported in Table 2.  
In general the models performed well explaining between 90.3 and 95 percent of the variation 
in total property values with an average adjusted R
2 of .9327.  Equation F-statistics are all 
significant at the 99 percent level of confidence ranging from 865.42 to 1754.15 with and 
average F-statistic of 1333.16.  The presentation of the results beyond these summary 
comments will focus first on the results related to the set of control variables and then the 
efficiency results associated with service levels. 
 
Control Variables  Of the 17 control variables ten are consistently significant at or above the 95 
percent level of confidence across the eleven specification of the model.  For ease of 
discussion, we have computed an “average” value of the coefficient and corresponding t-
statistic and report those averages in Table 3.  Because of differences in scaling across many 
of the control variables direct interpretation and comparison of individual average coefficients is 
difficult and to facilitate discussion we have computed a coefficient elasticity that is computed at 
the sample mean.
6  Consider population with a coefficient elasticity of .628, this implies that a 
ten percent increase in the municipality’s population will translate into a 6.3 percent increase in 
total property values, all else held constant.   
The age structure of the municipal population also significantly influences the 
aggregate property values: a ten percent increase in the percent of the population under age 20 
will decrease total property values by 7.7 percent while a ten percent increase in the percent of 
the population over age 65 will lead to a decline in total property values by 2.4 percent.  Both of 
these results make intuitive sense, younger families tend to live is more modest homes as do 
older persons.   Surprisingly per capita income and the percent of households with income less 
that $15,000 are not statistically significant, but percent of wealthy households, those with 
income over $100,000 is significant.  For the latter, a ten percent increase in the percent of 
households with an annual income of over $100,000 will see a 1.8 percent increase in total 
property value.  In addition, education levels of the local population seem to have a weak 
impact on total property values.  The negative coefficient is consistent with expectations and 
prior research and the coefficient elasticity appears to be reasonable, the low t-statistic 
suggests that education of the population does not in isolation influence property values.  The 
negative and significant coefficient on the unemployment rate is as expected and a ten percent 
                                                           
6 A coefficient elasticity is simply the value of the partial derivative of the equation evaluated at 
the sample mean: (∂Y/∂X)(X/Y) where X and Y are sample means for the independent and 
dependent variable respectively.  For a linear regression equation this reduces to βi(Xi/Y) where 
βi is the regression coefficient of the i
th variable (Xi). 
  8increase in the unemployment rate will see slightly less than a one percent decline in property 
values. 
Our measures capturing the characteristics of the housing stock also tend to be 
statistically significant.  The percent of the housing stock classified as recreational, a major 
component of the recreational industry in Wisconsin, has a positive albeit modest impact on 
total property value.  A ten percent increase in the percent of housing classified as recreational 
increases total property value by less than one percent.  This modest coefficient of elasticity is 
explained by the wide variation in the recreational housing market in Wisconsin which ranges 
from small hunting cabins to large lakefront summer homes.  Municipalities that tend to have a 
newer housing stock, as measured by percent of the housing stock built since 1980, also tend 
to have higher overall property values.  A ten percent increase in share of the housing stock 
that is newer will see a 1.5 percent increase in total values.  Surprisingly, median house value 
does not appear to impact total property values, but median rent does.  Indeed, a ten percent 
increase in median rent suggests that total property values increases by 2.3 percent.  The 
direction of causation here warrants a note.  It is more likely that high rents do not cause higher 
property values, but rather higher property values, everything else held constant, results in 
higher rents.  It is important to keep in mind that the role of the control variables is to separate 
out the impact of public service levels (i.e., expenditures) on aggregate property values. 
Our final set of control variables are intended to capture the structure of the municipal’s 
economy.  Here we include the percent of persons employed in traditional extractive industries 
(e.g., farming, fishing and forestry) which crudely captures the “ruralness” of the local economy, 
percent of persons in professional occupations and percent in manufacturing.  We also 
included percent of households with social security income which is intended to complement 
the age profile and income variables.  Of the four measures only one, percent of persons 
employed in manufacturing, is associated with total property values in a statistical sense.  
Interestingly higher levels of dependency on manufacturing for employment has a negative 
impact of total property values, a ten percent increase in dependency decreases property 
values by 1.6 percent.  The final control variable is the municipal type identifier and tends to be 
negative and significant and given its coding suggests that towns and villages have lower 
property values than cities, everything else held constant. 
 
Allocative Efficiency Now let us turn attention to the set of results central to this analysis, the 
results on public service levels proxied through expenditures.  Recall that we have three 
potential results: optimality (β1 = β2 = 0), over-provision (β1 < 0 and β2 < 0) under-provision (β1 > 
0 and β2 < 0). Consider first total expenditures (Model A), here both coefficients are statistically 
different from zero at above the 99 percent level of confidence, thus we can easily reject the 
result of optimality (β1 = β2 = 0).  For total expenditures, the data for Wisconsin municipalities 
  9supports the idea of under-provision (β1 = 25.9860 > 0 and β2 = -.0272 < 0).  This result 
suggests that spending levels, and corresponding taxation levels, could be increased for most 
municipalities in Wisconsin.  Given Wisconsin’s reputation as a “high tax and spend” state, this 
result is somewhat unexpected.  To determine the relative shape of the curve we compute the 
partial derivative of the equation with respect to expenditures and evaluate at the sample mean.  
For total expenditures the value of the partial derivative is 25.84 and the slope elasticity, again 
evaluated at the mean, is .467 suggesting that a ten percent increase in total expenditures will 
increase total property value by about 4.7 percent (Table 4).   
As we move across expenditure categories we see that the slope coefficients are all 
positive and statistically significant at or above the 99 percent level of confidence.  But, there is 
wide variation in the values of the slope elasticities.  Consider general government 
administration spending where the slope elasticity of .6268 suggests that a ten percent 
increase in total spending in this category could see total property values increase by 6.3 
percent, again evaluated at the sample mean.
7  But the slope elasticity for cultural and 
educational services is only .1087, suggesting that a ten percent increase in this service area 
will see only a 1.1 percent increase in total property values.  In general, the “standard” services 
such as police protection, road maintenance and waste services will have a larger impact on 
property values than more “luxury” services such as cultural and educational services and 
parks and recreational services. 
These latter results warrant three observations.  First, public service levels in 
Wisconsin are universally under-provided, or given Brueckner’s interpretation, there is no 
evidence of systemic over-provision of municipal services.  Second, the level of optimality 
varies significantly with type of public services and looking at total expenditures in isolation will 
mask important differences across service types.  Third, we can identify which services are 
closer to their optimal levels by examining the size of the slope elasticity.  Generally, the 
smaller the slope elasticity the closer the service level is to optimality.  
 
Application to Individual Municipalities  The power of the Brueckner test of allocative efficiency, 
or effectiveness, is that the statistical modeling can be evaluated on a municipal by municipal 
basis.  Consider the Village of Blanchardville, a municipality with a population 806 located 
about half way between Madison, Wisconsin and Dubuque, Iowa.  This is a rural community in 
one of the few counties in Wisconsin that is still predominately dependent upon production 
agriculture as its economic base.  The Village has a total budget of $667,000 of which 24.9 
percent is spent on protective police and fire services, 10.9 percent on general government 
                                                           
7 This latter result is particularly interesting because of the widely-held believe that local 
governments tend to be bloated with top heavy administration costs.  This result provides some 
evidence refuting this common believe. 
  10administration, 10.2 percent on road maintenance, nine percent on parks and recreational 
services and the balance distributed over the remaining expenditure categories.  Aggregate 
property value is assessed at just above $25.8 million.   
The slope elasticity for total expenditures for Blanchardville is .669 suggesting that if 
total expenditures increased by ten percent, total property values would increase by about 6.7 
percent.  The slope elasticity for individual services range from .977 for general administration 
and .726 for waste collection (water and solid waste) to .181 for ambulatory services and .098 
for conservation and community development efforts (Table 4).    This provides clear evidence 
for the officials of Blanchardville to devote additional responses to waste collection, road 
maintenance,  police and fire protection and parks and recreational services in that order.   
Consider now the example of the Village of Turtle Lake, a municipality with a population 
1,065 located about half way between Eau Claire and Superior, Wisconsin.  This is a rural 
community has a much larger daily population then residents due to the employment 
opportunities within the village limits.  In addition to the location of a handful of medium size 
manufacturing firms, Turtle Lake is also home to a medium sized Native American casino which 
employees about 900 persons.  The Village has a total budget of $1.67 million of which 13.1 
percent is spent on police protection, 5.6 percent on fire services, 9.8 percent on general 
government administration, and only 5.7 percent on road maintenance.  Just over five percent 
of the Village’s budget is spent on conservation and community development and is reflective 
of the Village’s attempts to build its economic base by taking advantage of the active casino.  
For example, the Village is seriously considering building a municipal golf course to 
complement the casino.  Aggregate property value is assessed at just above $36.7 million.
8   
The slope elasticity for total expenditures for Turtle Lake is 1.169 suggesting that a ten 
percent increase in total expenditures would result in an 11.7 percent increase in total property 
values (Table 4).  Based on our theory of capitalization, service levels in Turtle Lake are sub-
optimal and spending levels could be significantly increased.  By examining the slope 
elasticities for the individual expenditure categories, guidance can be lent into how additional 
resources could be spent.  Additional resources should be devoted to police protection, road 
maintenance and fire protection.  The data also suggest that despite the apparent high level of 
spending on conservation and community development, additional resources could be devoted 
                                                           
8 It is important to note that because of the legal status of the Chippewa Tribe, the Turtle Lake 
Casino is exempt from the property tax and is not included within our measure of assessed 
value.  This presents a potential problem with using assessed value computed for property 
taxes in that tax exempt properties are excluded.  For communities with a state university, state 
prison, or federal lands the issue of tax exempt properties can be a source of significant error in 
the model.  
  11to this area.  But unlike Blanchardville, the data suggests that waste services are close to 
optimal for Turtle Lake. 
The City of Stevens Point is a medium sized city with a population of 24,500 and is 
located in the geographic center of Wisconsin.  Stevens Point is a regional hub and has a 
diverse economic base and is home to the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point which is a 
four-year institution with a student population of 8,700.  The City has an annual budget of just 
over $25 million of which 16.3 percent is spent on police services, 9.9 percent on fire 
protection, 9.8 percent on road maintenance and 8.1 percent on parks and recreational 
services. 
Overall, like nearly all Wisconsin municipalities, total expenditures could be increased; 
a ten percent increase in total expenditures would result in an increase of total property values 
of 6.2 percent (Table 4).  The model suggests that Stevens Point is close to providing cultural 
and educational services at an optimal level but all other services could be systematically 
increased.  For example, a ten percent increase in parks and recreational services could result 
in a 4.3 percent increase in total property values and a ten percent increase in police 
expenditures could see a six percent increase in property values.   
But not all communities in Wisconsin are under-providing services.  Consider the case 
of Madison, the capital of Wisconsin and the home to the University of Wisconsin-Madison.  
The City has a population of just over 200,000 persons and the metropolitan area has a 
population of about one-half million people.  The City has an operating budget of just over $232 
million with 15.7 percent devoted to police services, 11.2 percent to fire protection, 11.3 percent 
to conservation and community development efforts and only 4.4 percent to road maintenance.  
Total assessed value is about $11.6 billion and large tracts of land are except from the property 
tax and hence not included in this analysis including all state government properties such as 
the University of Wisconsin. 
Examining the slope elasticities by service type presents some very interesting results.  
First, overall service levels again appear to be too low with a slope elasticity of .2677 
suggesting that a ten percent increase in total spending would increase total property values by 
about 2.7 percent (Table 4).
9  The data also suggests that Madison should increase spending 
on police protection, waste services and perhaps the most on parks and recreational services.  
Based on the slope elasticities, spending on road maintenance and fire protection appear to be 
close to optimal.  Possibly the more interesting result is that the model suggests that Madison is 
spending too much money on conservation and community development programs as well as 
                                                           
9 In the City of Madison ambulatory services are provided through the fire department.  This 
points to the care that must be taken when looking at individual municipalities.  Although the 
data adhere to strict accounting standards, the level of aggregation may mask important local 
considerations.   
  12cultural and educational services where the slope coefficients are -.1566 and -.2498, 
respectively.  Health and human services may also be over-provided but in Wisconsin these 
services are predominately the responsibility of county government. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The public sector at all levels is under increased pressure to do more with less.  This 
challenge, while not necessarily new, has traditionally been viewed as a two part problem.  The 
first part centers on the political structure’s, whether it be a city council or a town board, ability 
to determine the optimal, or allocative efficient, level of services.  Within the public 
administration literature this is widely described as the effectiveness of the government.  Is the 
political structure able to match the demands of the local citizenry in terms of service level 
provision?  The second, once the optimal allocation is determined, are those services produced 
at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer.  This second component is often referred to as 
production efficiency.   
While this separation is attractive from an academic perspective, in practice such 
subtleties are seldom discussed in public forums.  Perceptions of waste and inefficiency are 
addressed though reductions in expenditures.  But these reductions have allocative efficiency 
implications.  This research has been interested in providing an objective market-based 
measure of allocative efficiency.  We build on the idea of the Tiebout-Peterson notion of 
competitive markets where municipalities compete for residents and businesses.  Specifically 
we employ the idea of property value maximization as advanced by Brueckner and later 
Henderson.   
Public services are capitalized into property values in such a way that an inverted-U 
can be statistically traced out.  Observations to the left of the peak are said to be under-
providing services and increases in service levels can result in higher property values.  
Municipalities that are to the right of the peak of the inverted-U are said to be over-providing 
services and a reduction in service levels will result in increased aggregate property values.  
Observations that are at the peak of the curve are said to be providing services at an optimal 
level.  In addition, because municipalities generally run a balanced budget we need only look at 
expenditure levels.  Under a balanced budget increases (decreases) in expenditures must be 
match with an equal increase (decrease) in tax revenues.  Thus looking at expenditures or 
revenues is looking at two different sides to the same coin. 
Using detailed expenditure data matched to census data for Wisconsin municipalities 
we traced out what the inverted-U relationship looks like for total expenditures and ten separate 
services.  We found systematic evidence of service under-provision throughout much of the 
data.  Given Wisconsin’s reputation as a high tax and spending state, this finding is somewhat 
surprising.   Indeed, current public debates over fiscal policies have followed a common theme; 
  13taxes are too high but we expect the level of services to be maintained if not enhanced.  Over 
time Wisconsin residents have grown to demand high levels of public services and the model 
supports that causal observation. 
We have also demonstrated that the statistical modeling can be used to assess the 
level of allocative efficiency of individual observations.  By computing a slope elasticity 
evaluated at the observed values of any given municipality a normative statement about 
allocative efficiency can be made.  Slope elasticities close to zero are indicative of spending 
levels close to optimality.  The further the slope elasticity is from zero, either negative or 
positive, the greater the degree of allocative inefficiency.  In addition, if total expenditures is 
decomposed by service area, such as police protection or road maintenance, and individual 
models are estimated, then insights into how specific spending patterns should be altered can 
be observed.   
Like any performance measurement, the indicators we offer here should be viewed as 
an additional piece, albeit a large piece, to a complex puzzle.  While the introduction of 
performance measures into public fiscal policy discussions has been widely welcomed, care 
must be taken not to fall into the trap of “paralyze by analysis” or being overwhelmed with 
performance measures that may be contradictory or not internally consistent. A laundry list of 
performance measures diffuses focus, spawns unproductive "busywork," and provides enough 
bureaucratic cover to justify pet projects or protect turf. 
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Table 1 Sample Descriptive Statistics  Standard 
Min  Max  Average Deviation
Population  37  59    2   ,899 1   6,061 6,974          
Percent of the Population under Age 20  9.5%  28.5% 0.047 58.1%
Percent of the Population over Age 65  2.8%  14.4% 0.054 46.2%
Percent of Housing Stock Classified as Recreational  0.0%  22.8% 0.503 434.4%
Percent of Occupied Houses Occupied by Owners  23.9%  82.1% 0.103 98.9%
6.5%  100.0% Percent of Persons over 25 with High School Education or Less 57.9% 0.115
Unemployment Rate  0.0%  4.4% 0.031 38.0%
0.0%  20.0% Percent of Employed Persons in Farming, Fishing and Forestry 2.6% 0.026
0.0%  83.2% Percent of Employed Persons in Professional Occupations 26.4% 0.082
Percent of Employed Persons in in Manufacturing  0.0%  22.4% 0.085 58.8%
0.0%  46.9% Percent of Households with Income less than $15,000 12.8% 0.066
Percent of Households with Income over $100,000  0.0%  7.5% 0.066 67.3%
Percent of Household with Social Security Income  10.9%  34.1% 0.100 89.3%
Per Capita Income  915  7,    94    $   1   9,478 5   ,519 $   $   ,479   
Percent of Housing Stock Built Since 1980  0.0%  29.8% 0.115 85.4%
Median House Value  - 
 
1   00,936 $   4   4,650    $     
 
81    0,000 $  
Median Rent Value  -    1,    $   4   72 1  50 $   $   625   
  18Table 2: Property Value Model 
Model B  Model C  Model A Model D Model E
Intercept  -74.6720  -16.5540  -96.5560 -1.3015 272.0740
(1.21)  (0.26)  (0.02) (3.22) (1.49)
Population  0.0234  0.0239  0.0224 0.0346 0.0313
(21.66)  (19.39)  (26.17) (114.53) (17.20)
Percent of the Population under Age 20  -346.3630 -302.3230  -250.2100 -356.4440 -586.0340
(3.62)  (3.04)  (2.49) (3.27) (4.42)
Percent of the Population over Age 65  -98.3274  -53.9972  -19.9390 -232.6420 -566.4460
(0.99)  (0.52)  (2.07) (4.13) (0.19)
10.8467  15.9804  Percent of Housing Stock Classified as Recreational 16.9877 25.9772 39.0298
(1.24)  (1.77)  (2.63) (3.24) (1.86)
215.6450  204.9500  258.3840 145.6450 Percent of Occupied Houses Occupied by Owners 215.1770
(4.84)  (4.42)  (4.59) (5.07) (2.39)
-67.7449 -114.7850  -77.5502 -119.5710 Percent of Persons over 25 with High School Education or Less -89.1717
(1.33)  (2.17)  (1.33) (1.69) (1.66)
Unemployment Rate  -316.2500 -299.3720  -235.9840 -238.0530 -168.1620
(3.07)  (2.80)  (2.03) (1.17) (2.18)
-31.7128  -93.5784  118.1190 131.4230 Percent of Employed Persons in Farming, Fishing and Forestry -64.6245
(0.24)  (0.69)  (0.47) (0.80) (0.73)
-28.9577  23.9710  Percent of Employed Persons in Professional Occupations 17.9763 95.6765 218.4670
(0.47)  (0.38)  (1.37) (2.57) (0.28)
-110.9210  -81.9878 -118.4160 -63.0888 Percent of Employed Persons in in Manufacturing -91.9161
(2.69)  (1.91)  (2.12) (2.52) (1.10)
-27.4875  -61.0315  -59.9768 -56.3423 Percent of Households with Income less than $15,000 -80.2174
(0.36)  (0.77)  (0.68) (0.53) (0.99)
335.7540  448.6910  313.6790 313.8180 Percent of Households with Income over $100,000 420.4310
(3.08)  (3.95)  (3.66) (2.52) (2.07)
55.0916  54.9999  91.0274 110.6570 Percent of Household with Social Security Income 61.5655
(0.97)  (0.93)  (1.41) (1.40) (1.03)
Per Capita Income  -0.0011  -0.0015  -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0010
(0.78)  (1.04)  (0.08) (0.52) (0.31)
Percent of Housing Stock Built Since 1980  54.3793  113.0990  76.1947 96.0333 79.9225
(1.86)  (3.71)  (2.86) (1.96) (2.48)
Median House Value  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.41)  (0.19)  (0.15) (0.06) (0.01)
Median Rent Value  0.0602  0.0700  0.0859 0.0629 0.0793
(2.34)  (2.63)  (3.18) (2.15) (2.23)
Municipal Type Identifier  12.2136  -5.4485  -1.4328 -42.7885 -69.8399
(1.67)  (0.74)  (5.55) (7.40) (0.19)
Total Expenditures  25.9860
(22.08)
Total Expenditures Squared  -0.0272
(43.15)
Government Administration  347.6090 
(24.07) 
Government Administration Squared  -2.9307 
(34.28) 
Police Protection  152.5230 
(21.02) 
Police Protection Squared  -0.7987 
(36.90) 
Fire Protection  130.0500
(12.54)
Fire Protection Squared  -2.1755
(36.28)
Ambulatory Service  738.1100
(12.25)
Ambulatory Service Squared  -146.4240
(6.23)
Adjusted R-squared  0.9499  0.9461  0.9448 0.9352 0.9033
1754.15  1625.36  F-stat   1584.43 1336.40 865.42
Number in parentheses is the absolute value of the t-statistic.
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Table 2: Property Value Model (cont) 
Model F Model G Model H  Model I  Model J Model K
Intercept  -99.8295 135.6210 33.6149  -62.1255  125.9400 -15.5005
(1.49) (2.00) (0.47)  (0.84)  (1.61) (0.21)
Population  0.0358 0.0232 0.0415  0.0448  0.0274 0.0359
(37.46) (22.33) (55.82)  (52.91)  (90.38) (41.70)
Percent of the Population under Age 20  -347.3100 -457.7350 -407.8740  -402.7220  -468.0430 -360.5770
(3.34) (4.36) (3.68)  (3.53)  (3.85) (3.11)
Percent of the Population over Age 65  -192.9050 -324.6620 -342.1510  -299.9970  -327.9210 -220.5570
(1.79) (2.99) (2.99)  (2.54)  (2.61) (1.84)
Percent of Housing Stock Classified as Recreational  16.2084 21.7850 32.3058  27.5811  29.7518 30.4077
(1.71) (2.29) (3.22)  (2.66)  (2.68) (2.90)
Percent of Occupied Houses Occupied by Owners  267.3350 156.2180 283.6460  324.3610  184.7770 284.0190
(5.52) (3.19) (5.52)  (6.12)  (3.30) (5.29)
Percent of Persons over 25 with High School Education or Less -53.3999 -106.3460 -57.0999  -45.6824  -104.2790 -81.6732
(0.96) (1.90) (0.97)  (0.75)  (1.61) (1.32)
Unemployment Rate  -261.6890 -268.4780 -246.8370  -250.9730  -70.9170 -239.2280
(2.34) (2.38) (2.07)  (2.04)  (0.54) (1.92)
Percent of Employed Persons in Farming, Fishing and Forestry 141.4930 -15.3901 140.4970  196.0520  10.8727 92.8058
(1.00) (0.11) (0.94)  (1.27)  (0.07) (0.59)
Percent of Employed Persons in Professional Occupations 9.7156 74.4219 114.9120  78.2895  212.7720 92.6237
(0.15) (1.11) (1.62)  (1.07)  (2.73) (1.25)
Percent of Employed Persons in in Manufacturing  -114.1850 -119.8720 -130.1120  -142.8440  -66.2829 -115.2860
(2.54) (2.65) (2.73)  (2.90)  (1.26) (2.31)
Percent of Households with Income less than $15,000 7.8696 -50.2462 -54.3708  22.3066  -117.5110 -96.8182
(0.09) (0.60) (0.61)  (0.24)  (1.20) (1.04)
Percent of Households with Income over $100,000  203.6370 378.1050 289.6960  245.2840  422.0330 357.8380
(1.72) (3.16) (2.30)  (1.88)  (3.05) (2.71)
Percent of Household with Social Security Income  83.9480 95.2778 107.6800  86.0024  110.2150 84.0404
(1.36) (1.53) (1.64)  (1.27)  (1.53) (1.22)
Per Capita Income  0.0009 -0.0008 0.0001  0.0004  -0.0007 -0.0001
(0.57) (0.54) (0.08)  (0.24)  (0.40) (0.05)
Percent of Housing Stock Built Since 1980  55.5402 91.8929 73.9159  50.0723  75.6091 54.1312
(1.75) (2.86) (2.18)  (1.43)  (2.03) (1.53)
Median House Value  0.0001 0.0000 0.0000  0.0001  -0.0001 0.0000
(0.75) (0.07) (0.19)  (0.54)  (0.58) (0.15)
Median Rent Value  0.0496 0.0769 0.0606  0.0482  0.1061 0.0859
(1.78) (2.73) (2.04)  (1.57)  (3.26) (2.76)
Municipal Type Identifier  -21.8292 -31.4774 -59.8229  -39.7682  -55.0061 -40.6184
(2.82) (4.23) (7.74)  (4.82)  (5.92) (4.94)
Road Maintenance  211.3250
(14.65)
Road Maintenance Squared  -4.9395
(36.09)
Waste Services  573.4530
(28.37)
Waste Services Squared  -15.9108
(33.61)
Health and Human Services  273.4740 
(12.21) 
Health and Human Services Squared  -16.9264 
(30.77) 
Cultural and Educational Services  181.4080 
(11.44) 
Cultural and Educational Services Squared  -28.5255 
(31.15) 
Parks and Recreational Services  150.5560
(7.88)
Parks and Recreational Services Squared  14.3685
(5.51)
Conservation and Community Development Programs 164.2150
(19.68)
Conservation and Community Development Programs Squared -4.4592
(28.70)
Adjusted R-squared  0.9398 0.9330  0.9288  0.9192 0.9267
F-stat   1445.7 1290.12  1207.19  1052.99 1169.87
Number in parentheses is the absolute value of the t-statistic.Table 3 Base Model Summary Estimates




statistic  Parameter 
Population  0.0313  (45.41) 0.628
Percent of the Population under Age 20  -389.6032  (3.52) -0.768
Percent of the Population over Age 65  -243.595  (2.06) -0.242
24.2601  Percent of Housing Stock Classified as Recreational (2.38) 0.038
230.9234  (4.57) 1.312 Percent of Occupied Houses Occupied by Owners
-83.3912  (1.43) -0.334 Percent of Persons over 25 with High School Education or Less
Unemployment Rate  -235.9948  (2.05) -0.073
56.9052  Percent of Employed Persons in Farming, Fishing and Forestry (0.63) 0.010
82.7152  (1.18) 0.151 Percent of Employed Persons in Professional Occupations
-104.992  (2.25) -0.163 Percent of Employed Persons in in Manufacturing
-52.1660  (0.65) -0.046 Percent of Households with Income less than $15,000
338.9969  (2.74) 0.177 Percent of Households with Income over $100,000
85.5005  Percent of Household with Social Security Income (1.30) 0.202
Per Capita Income  -0.0004  (0.42) -0.055
74.6173  Percent of Housing Stock Built Since 1980 (2.24) 0.154
Median House Value  0.0001  (0.28) 0.009
Median Rent Value  0.0714  (2.42) 0.233
 
 








Total Expenditures 25.9316 (22.06) 0.4691
Government Administration 346.0752 (24.04) 0.6268
Police Protection 151.9171 (20.98) 0.3988
Fire Protection 128.9954 (12.45) 0.2164
Ambulatory Service 729.5727 (12.36) 0.1472
Road Maintenance 208.5157 (14.52) 0.4104
Waste Services 570.2736 (28.24) 0.3944
Health and Human Services 272.0265 (12.16) 0.0805
Cultural and Educational Services 176.3269 (11.13) 0.1087
Parks and Recreational Services 153.8599 (8.28) 0.1224
Conservation and Community Development Programs 162.7638 (19.49) 0.1833 
 









Total Expenditures 0.6691 1.1693 0.6233 0.2677
Government Administration 0.9772 1.5276 0.4753 0.3588
Police Protection 0.5305 0.9005 0.6025 0.2969
Fire Protection 0.3812 0.3269 0.2990 0.0370
Ambulatory Service 0.1807 0.0866 0.4271 0.0000
Road Maintenance 0.5547 0.5392 0.4631 0.0973
Waste Services 0.7263 0.0397 0.4140 0.1617
Health and Human Services 0.0380 0.0000 0.0131 -0.0548
Cultural and Educational Services 0.1918 0.1643 0.0183 -0.2498
Parks and Recreational Services 0.3529 0.1416 0.4304 0.3571
Conservation and Community Development Programs 0.0979 0.3858 0.1411 -0.1566
Population 806 1,065              24,551             208,054            
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